Karen Kwiatkowski closes out Why We Fight with the answer the whole documentary has been implying.
Why do we fight? Has your answer changed?
Segment X shows all the cards. No more commentary than that is necessary.
Thoughts?
Segment IX includes the opening of Senator Robert Byrd’s (D-West Virginia) February 12, 2003 speech:
To contemplate war is to think about the most horrible of human experiences. On this February day, as this nation stands at the brink of battle, every American on some level
must be contemplating the horrors of war.Yet, this Chamber is, for the most part, silent — ominously, dreadfully silent.
There is no debate, no discussion, no attempt to lay out for the nation the pros and cons of this particular war. There is nothing.
We stand passively mute in the United States Senate, paralyzed by our own uncertainty, seemingly stunned by the sheer turmoil of events. (Source)
The failure of the Congress to debate the issue is stunning.
Segment IX also discusses the impact of being perceived to be against a strong defense can have on one’s career as a journalist, an “expert”, and of course a politician.
What would it take to get back to a place where individuals in the public sector didn’t constantly take into account the impact their views on the defense industry might have on their careers? Is it even possible to return to such a state?
Did the Bush Administration mislead the American public about the presence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq? Did the Administration imply — directly or indirectly — a connection between Iraq and 9/11?
Part VIII starts getting to the real heart of the issue.
Did the media perform its role adequately in the months before the war?
We create our own monsters, both in the realm of psychological fears and in the realm of international relations. Segment VII points out how we created Saddam Hussein, supported him, and were a friend until his invasion of Kuwait.
Hussein was a textbook example of blowback.
Part VII also introduces the concept of a fourth element of the military-industrial complex:
- The military
- The defense industry
- Congress
- Think tanks
Kwiatkowski summarizes the problems of think tanks perfectly: People making policy who have zero accountability to the public. She then goes on to give a devastating insider view of the lead up to the war in Iraq.
Think tanks — good, bad, or neither?
Part VI begins to discuss the issue of “smart” weapons and just how smart they are.
Segment VI also introduces William Solomon, a New Yorker who enlists as a career move and looks at recruiting methods.
Quotes of the segment:
- “We appeal to people’s self-interest[ in recruiting for the military], and then put them in a situation that’s based on self-sacrifice.”
- Wilton Sekzer, on answering your country’s call in the past: “There was no such thing as, ‘Well, I wonder if my country is right.’ Is anybody lying to me about this?’ You don’t grow up thinking that. You grow up saying, ‘If the bugle calls, you go.’”
Was Sekzer’s earlier line of thinking too dangerous for the 21st century? Can we ever have that kind of trust in our leadership? Was it misplaced trust even 60 years ago?
Segment V goes into the core of how the military-industrial complex influences government. The B2 bomber has parts of it made in every state, Chalmers points out, so if someone every tries to cut that program, guess who’s going to protest. Every member of Congress. Indeed, an unnamed Representative goes so far as to say, “God bless our contractors.”
In short, part V shows the depth of the problem. And how worthy of impeachment Cheney is.
What do you think of Cheney and his career path?
Eisenhower was a five-star general, but he was not a gung-ho military man. When the reality of a permanent arms industry seemed inevitable, Eisenhower counted the cost of bombers in terms of school buildings and power plants. The Cold War, and the resulting military build-up, came at a cost of domestic spending, and Eisenhower not only recognized it but commented on it — and warned about the consequences.
Within the first minute of this fourth segment, you’re likely to develop a new respect for Eisenhower. By three minutes, once you’ve heard segments of Eisenhower’s farewell address, you’ll be wondering whether the man was not the world’s last true prophet.
Most disturbing, though, is the footage from the 2003 AUSA Defense Show. The footage from KBR’s booth is absolutely terrifying.
Most striking are McCain’s words: “President Eisenhower was worried about the military-industrial complex. His words, unfortunately, have come true.”
The question of why we fight continues. Kwiatkowski contends, “If you went downtown and asked five different people, ‘Why do we fight?’ you’d get five different answers.” And then we hear from, curiously, four people.
Part three introduces Wilton Sekzer’s idea for what to do in the memory of his son. His idea dates to the Second World War, but I’m not sure what Sekzer thought such an action would do. I think it adds legitimacy to the notion that Sekzer was a normal Joe Blow who initially supported the war.
Part three introduces one of the most intriguing voices in the documentary: that of Anh Duong, who fled Saigon in 1976 and helped develop the bunker buster bomb.
A clip from Bush: Iraq continues to “support terror.” The linking of 9/11 to Iraq in the minds of the American people begins.
Most notably, McCain raises the question of when the United States’ use of force changes from a force for good to a force for imperialism.
The fall of the Soviet Union provided the opportunity to solidify America’s world influence into an empire, Chalmers Johnson argues in part two. “We are the new Rome.”
Part two introduces a number of critical voices in the documentary.
- Introduced first is Richard Perle, noted conservative thinker and member of Project for the New American Century — itself a controversial group that somehow played a part in the planning of the 9/11 attacks, conspiracy theorists suggest. Key line: “What’s the big fuss about preemption?”
- William Kristol, editor of The Weekly Standard, also makes his first appearance in this segment.
- Another major figure in the documentary makes her first appearance in part two as well: Lt. Col. Karen Kwiatkowski. In the Pentegon at the time of the attack, Kwiatkowski later went on to author “comprehensive writings on the subject of a corrupting influence of the Pentagon on intelligence analysis leading up to the Iraq War” (Wikipedia). She is, in short, a critic.
- Additionally, ‘Fuji’ and ‘Tooms’ make their appearance. ‘Fuji’ and ‘Tooms’ are the two pilots who flew the initial mission over Baghdad in 2003.
- Colonel Richard Treadway (Commander of the Air Force’s Stealth Fighter Squadron) and James G. Roche, (Secretary of the Air Force) present information as well.
- Susan Eisenhower, the President’s granddaughter, provides information about Eisenhower’s view on the necessity of WWII and the results of the resulting armament industry.
- Gore Vidal, critic, playwright, and just about everything else, enters midway through. Vidal makes the claim that Japan had been trying to surrender throughout the whole summer of 1945. I’d never heard anything about this, but Vidal provides no documentation.
- John S. D. Eisenhower, the President’s son, discusses Eisenhower’s view of war in general in the bombing of Hiroshima in particular.
The segment ends with interviews of civilians, discussing one question: “What are we fighting for.” Some of the answers are frightening.
Why are we fighting? What’s your view?
